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ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to advance the current state of physical layer security through
the design and analysis of a discrete jamming scheme that exploits the reciprocal characteristic of the
wireless channel with the aim to create equivocation to a passivemultiple-antenna eavesdropper. Closed form
solutions of the secrecy capacity for different configurations of the jamming component were obtained and
successfully compare with the simulation results. Furthermore, the secrecy level provided by the developed
scheme is analyzed taking into account the number of bits extracted from the channel. The asymptotic study
of the proposed secrecy technique allowed to conclude that in the high-power regime, full secrecy is obtained
even considering that the eavesdropper is equipped with an unlimited number of antennas.
INDEX TERMS Physical layer security, secrecy capacity, jamming, channel reciprocity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The flexibility to exchange data between humans without the
need to establish a physical connection in the access was one
of the main reasons that led to the proliferation of wireless
networks observed today. While in the past this intercon-
nection was performed only among humans, the emerging
concept of the Internet of Things (IoT) aims to put billions
of objects exchanging data together in an autonomous way.
Considering that the access connection of most part of
these objects will be done through the wireless channel, the
IoT paradigm promises to place the densification of wire-
less terminals at unprecedented levels. The large amount of
objects equipped with wireless transceivers challenges the
security level of wireless networks in the sense that any
regular object can act as a source of eavesdropping. The tech-
nological evolution described above reinforces the need for
a continuous improvement of the wireless networks security
through the design of efficient secrecy schemes.
Since the appearance of initial wireless standards, pro-
tection against eavesdropping attacks has been supported
by higher layer cryptographic protocols [1]. Although the
widespread integration of these protocols in wireless com-
munications, information secrecy is only achieved in the
case of insufficient computational processing capacity at the
eavesdropper [2].
In order to overcome the vulnerabilities associated with the
use of standalone cryptographic protocols [3], [4], exploita-
tion of the random characteristics of the physical wireless
channel have been object of intensive research in order to
find new schemes that improve the secrecy performance of
future wireless standards. The achievement of information
secrecy at the physical layer is the result of forcing a channel
advantage in relation to the eavesdropper; therefore, contrar-
ily to what happens with higher layer cryptographic proto-
cols, physical layer security does not rely on the underlying
assumption that the eavesdropper has limited computational
resources [5].
In 1949, Claude Shannon defined some of the theoretical
basis applied today in the design of secure communication
channels. Shannon [6] stated that to achieve perfect secrecy
would be required to use an independent secure key with at
least the same size and entropy of the information source.
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In his work, Shannon assumed that the secure key was the
only information not shared between the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper. Therefore, from the perspective of
wireless communications, the channel model used in [6] does
not reflects the features of a real wireless channel, making
the statement above somehow pessimistic for this type of
systems. A few years later, Csiszár and Korner [7] considered
a more realistic scenario assuming different discrete mem-
oryless channels for the legitimate receiver and eavesdrop-
per. Under this assumption, Csiszár and Korner [7] made
a theoretical analysis regarding the secrecy level of such a
system. While Csiszár and Korner [7] considered a discrete
memoryless wiretap channel, the work in [8] introduced by
the first time the Gaussian wiretap channel, defining at the
same time the respective secrecy capacity. Using some of
the theoretical foundations established in these early works,
new practical secrecy schemes have been developed with
the purpose of providing information secrecy in practical
communication scenarios. In recent literature it is possible
to identify two major research domains in the design of
physical layer secrecy schemes: the coding and the signal
level domain. In the coding domain, the main objective is
to design error-correction codes that also implement some
level of secrecy in a wiretap channel [9]–[12]. In the case of
signaling, techniques involving specific precoding designs,
power allocation schemes, and cooperative jamming based
on interference alignment (IA) [13], [14] and artificial noise
injection have been defined in [15]–[20].
The secure degrees-of-freedom (DoF) of the wiretap chan-
nel were obtained in [21] considering the help of several
cooperative jammers employing a single antenna. In this
work the authors assume that the eavesdropper channel-state-
information (CSI) is not available at the legitimate nodes
and demonstrate that positive secure DoF are obtained by
forcing the alignment of the jamming signals at the legit-
imate receiver. However, the need of having at least one
jammer limits the implementation of the scheme proposed
in [21] to scenarios with terminals available to cooperate.
Xie and Ulukus [22] extend the work of [21] and derive
the secure DoF of different network structures, with the
difference that this time, IA is applied assuming that eaves-
dropper channel knowledge is available at the transmitters.
Despite the necessity of having jammers available to coop-
erate, the scheme in [22] is also limited in the sense that
does not take into account the presence of passive eavesdrop-
pers. To remove this drawback, Goel and Negi [23] show
that by combining information data with artificial noise, a
positive secrecy capacity is achieved when the noise signal
is transmitted in the null-space direction of the legitimate
receiver. The main limitation of the scheme suggested in [23]
is related to the fact that positive secrecy is reached only when
the total number of antennas at the legitimate transmitter
is larger than the number of antennas at the eavesdropper.
For example, if we consider a massive MIMO eavesdropper,
i.e. with a large number of antennas, the previous condition
may not be respected. The problem of pilot contamination
attacks in TDD multi-cell multiuser massive MIMO systems
is focused in [24]. To address the secrecy capacity reduc-
tion caused by contaminated channel estimations, the work
in [24] explores the excess degrees of freedom of a maximum
ratio transmission (MRT) based massive MIMO system in
order to generate artificial noise (AN) using random shaping
matrix precoding as well as null-space (NS) based precod-
ing. Taking into account the large computational complex-
ity required to calculate the NS of large channel matrices,
Zhu et al. [24] verified that the use of random shaping matri-
ces for AN precoding could offer a good solution in terms of
performance/complexity tradeoff.
Another important research path considered in the design
of physical layer secrecy schemes explores the recipro-
cal characteristic of the wireless channel to establish a
secure random key shared among the legitimate parties.
In [25] and [26], the potential of received-signal-
strength (RSS) and channel phase estimations for key gener-
ation is analyzed. While Ren et al. [25] and Wang et al. [26]
focus on methods to extract secret keys, other schemes
use those keys to increase the level of randomness in the
transmitted data symbols [27], [28]. Anjos et al. [27] sug-
gested a secrecy scheme that uses the reciprocal channel
phase to randomly select discrete jamming signals at the
legitimate nodes. In a preliminary secrecy evaluation, infor-
mation data and discrete jamming signals are randomly
combined in order to generate equivocation at the eaves-
dropper. In the second part of the work, the design of an
efficient combining algorithm was proposed to improve the
secrecy level of the initial random combining technique. The
main drawback of the work in [27] is related to the fact
that no general closed formulations for the secrecy capacity
are provided, with the performance assessment limited to
simulation results without making any theoretical analysis
of the asymptotical behavior. Instead of using the reciprocal
channel phase to define jamming signals Chen et al. [28]
suggest to apply continuous random phase rotations in the
transmitted data symbols. However, the method proposed
in [28] only works when PSK signals are considered, being
the proposed scheme insecure when QAM constellations are
used.
In this paper, we propose to enhance the secrecy level
of wireless networks through the design and analysis of a
discrete jamming scheme that uses the randomness of the
reciprocal wireless channel to force interference at a passive
multiple-antenna eavesdropper. The exploration of the reci-
procity feature of the channel allows the legitimate receiver to
have enough information to cancel the jamming component;
therefore, equivocation is only verified at the eavesdropper
side. In summary, the main contributions of the present work
are described in the following points:
a) Design of a discrete jamming scheme that exploits
the reciprocal wireless channel with the aim of create
equivocation at a passive eavesdropper;
b) Considering different configurations in the design of
the jamming component, closed form solutions for the
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secrecy capacity are derived and successfully compared
with simulation results.
c) Through an asymptotical mathematical analysis,
we prove that in the high power regime, full secrecy
capacity is reached independently of the number of
antennas at the eavesdropper;
d) The secrecy level provided by the different configu-
rations of the jamming component is also analyzed
taking into account the number of bits extracted from
the channel.
Contrarily to the modular operation applied in [6], in this
work the secret key extracted from the reciprocal legitimate
channel is combined with the information source using inte-
ger addition. The physical practicality of integer addition
extends the relevance of the presented work to scenarios
where the secret key must be combined with the information
source in a superposition physical process.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II defines the general system model and the secrecy
metrics used in the evaluation of the considered jamming
technique. The secrecy scheme proposed in this manuscript
is formulated in section III. A detailed mathematical analysis
of the secrecy capacity of the suggested technique is provided
in section IV. SectionV presents the numerical and theoretical
results used to assess themerit of the developedwork. Finally,
the main conclusions are outlined in section VI.
Notations: Boldface capital letters denote matrices and
boldface lowercase letters denote column vectors. The norm
of vector a is given by ‖a‖, being the cardinality of a random
variable X defined as |X |. The probability mass function of
the random variable X is defined as p(X ). The symbol 0(n)
is the gamma function defined as 0(n) = (n − 1)!, while
bnc defines the highest integer lower than n. The set of all
binary numbers of size n is defined as Bn. The maximum
value between 0 and n is defined as [n]+.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND EVALUATION METRICS
This section presents the system setup as well as the evalua-
tion metrics used to assess the performance of the proposed
secrecy scheme.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
In Fig. 1 is depicted the general model considered for the
jamming scheme focused in this work. The following nodes
compose the system: ‘A’ is the legitimate transmitter (Alice);
‘B’ is the legitimate receiver (Bob); and ‘E’ is the eavesdrop-
per (Eve). We assume that ‘A’ and ‘B’ are single antenna ter-
minals, being ‘E’ a multiple antenna node with NE elements.
In Fig. 1, signal d defines information data that ‘A’ pretends
to exchange with ‘B’, u (θBA) represents the jamming com-
ponent used to protect information from ‘E’, hBA and hEA
are the channel coefficients modeled by complex Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and unitary variance, and
finally nB, nE represents zero mean complex Gaussian noise
with variance σ 2B and σ
2
E .
FIGURE 1. General system model.
Defining the transmitted signal at node ‘A’ by xA,
the received signals at ‘B’ and ‘E’ are formulated in (1) and
(2) respectively,
yB = hBAxA + nB, (1)
yE = hEAxA + nE . (2)
Furthermore, we consider TDD channel reciprocity and
perfect channel estimations at ‘A’ and ‘B’, which are acquired
through a bidirectional training process. Although we assume
perfect channel estimations, in practice there are always some
noise in the training channels that limits the amount of infor-
mation that can be extracted. In the analytical derivations of
the secrecy capacity we didn’t considered the impact of prac-
tical channel estimation constraints. Additionally, we assume
that ‘E’ is a passive terminal, and is not collocated with ‘B’,
i.e., independence between hBA and hEA is verified. The
assumption of a passive eavesdropper means that this node
listens the communication and does not cause any intentional
interference in the communication channel, making his pres-
ence and location uncertain to the legitimate transmitter. The
transmitted power is constrained to E[‖xA‖2] ≤ P. Ideal
RF up- and down-conversion is also considered, with all the
baseband processing applied to an independent flat fading
channel realization.
B. EVALUATION METRIC
The secrecy metric used to assess the jamming scheme pro-
posed in this work is the secrecy capacity Cs, which is given
by,
Cs = [I (d; yB)− I (d; yE )]+ (3)
where I (d; yB) is the mutual information between the source
of information d and the signal observed at the legitimate
receiver. The amount of information regarding the source that
is extracted by the eavesdropper through the observation of
signal, yE is quantified in I (d; yE ). The mutual information
terms in (3) can be defined as
I (d; yB) = h(d)− h(d |yB) (4)
I (d; yE ) = h(d)− h(d |yE ) (5)
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where h(d) is the entropy of the data source with h(d |yB) and
h(d |yE ) being the equivocations at the legitimate terminal and
at the eavesdropper, respectively.
III. PROPOSED JAMMING SCHEME
The main idea behind the secrecy scheme proposed in this
work is to use the phase of the reciprocal wireless channel
to define discrete jamming signals at ‘A’ and ‘B’. After the
selection of the jamming signals at ‘A’, information data
is combined with the jamming component at the legitimate
transmitter, being that component posteriorly canceled at ‘B’.
In the suggested scheme, M -QAM constellations are used
in the definition of d as well for the jamming terms uk that
compose the jamming component u(θBA) formulated in (7).
Taking into account the polar representation of the legit-
imate channel hBA = |hBA| ejθBA , the signal transmitted
at ‘A’ is given by
xA = d + u(θBA), (6)
with the jamming component formulated as the superposition
of the N jamming signals uk , k = 1, . . . ,N as follows
u(θBA) =
N∑
k=1
uk . (7)
Additionally, we consider that the power constraint P is
equally divided between d and each jamming term uk in (7),
i.e. to each jamming term in (7) and to d is assigned
P/(N + 1).
While d is selected uniformly from a single square
M -QAM constellation, the jamming component u(θBA) is
generated combiningN squareM -QAMconstellations taking
into account the phase θBA of the reciprocal channel. For a
single antenna at node ‘A’, the amount of information that
must be extracted from the channel phase θBA in order to
define u(θBA) is equal to log2(M
N ) bits, where each group
bk ∈ Blog2M , k = 1, 2, . . . ,N of log2(M ) bits is a random
variable used to select randomly the specific constellation
point for a single uk , k = 1, 2, . . . ,N . Defining the M -
QAM constellation set as Q = { q0 q1 . . . . qM−1 }, the dis-
crete jamming points are given by uk = qjk , where jk =
f (bk ) is computed using a bijective function defined as f :
Blog2M 7→ Q, i.e. f makes a one-to-one mapping between
the binary words in Blog2M and the constellation points
in Q.
In order to allow an easier understanding regarding the
mapping process between θBA and the construction of u(θBA),
let’s consider the case where N = 2 and M = 4, i.e.
u(θBA) = u1 + u2 with u1, u2 selected independently and
uniformly from a 4-QAM set defined as Q = { q0 q1 q2 q3 }.
Since N = 2 and M = 4, the amount of information that we
have to extract from the channel to define u(θBA) is equal to
log2(4
2) = 4 bits, i.e. sixteen different combinations of u1, u2
must be indexed by the channel phase. Therefore, as depicted
in Fig. 2, what we do is divide the phase range of θBA in
sixteen equal size slices, being each slice used to index a
FIGURE 2. Mapping between the channel phase θBA and u(θBA)
considering the case of N = 2 and M = 4.
specific pair u1, u2. The numbers in the inner part of Fig. 2 are
the indexes of the symbols inQ that will define the pair u1, u2,
while the respective binary representations are defined in the
outer part. For instance, suppose that in a given realization
of the channel 0 ≤ θBA < pi/8, in this case u1 = q0 and
u2 = q3.
Since θBA is uniformly distributed, and the phase range of
θBA is equally divided, the symbols u1, u2 are independent
of each other. For instance, if the first selected symbol is
u1 = q0, then the conditional probability for u2 assuming
that u1 = q0, is p(q0|q0) = p(q1|q0) = p(q2|q0) = p(q3|q0).
After the legitimate transmitter computes u(θBA), the sig-
nals received at ‘B’ and ‘E’ are given by,
yB = hBA
[
d +
N∑
k=1
uk
]
+ nB, (8)
yE = hEA
[
d +
N∑
k=1
uk
]
+ nE . (9)
One of the targets of this work is to analyze the amount of
information that ‘B’ and ‘E’ can obtain from the observation
of (8) and (9), respectively. Considering that node ‘B’ has
access to hBA, N andM , the amount of uncertainty created by
u(θBA) can be fully eliminated at ‘B’. In the case of node ‘E’,
information regarding hEA, N and M is not enough to elimi-
nate the equivocation generated by the jamming component.
In order quantify the secrecy level of the proposed jam-
ming scheme, the mathematical derivation of the theoretical
secrecy capacity is described in section IV.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SECRECY CAPACITY
The purpose of this section is to compute analytically
the secrecy capacity of the jamming scheme described
in section III. The analytical evaluation is done for general
M andN parameters considering both the noiseless and noisy
channel cases.
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A. NOISELESS CHANNEL
In this first scenario it is assumed that the noise variance at
the legitimate receiver as well at the eavesdropper is zero, i.e.
σ 2B = 0 and σ 2E = 0, respectively.
1) CLOSED FORM FORMULATION FOR GENERAL N AND M
In order to compute the secrecy capacity formulated in (3),
we will start by deriving the individual channel capacities
at ‘B’ and ‘E’ using the expressions defined in (4), (5), (8)
and (9). In the case of the legitimate channel capacity,
the amount of information extracted by ‘B’ from the obser-
vation of yB is,
I (d; yB, hBA) = h(d)− h (d |yB, hBA)
= log2(M )− h
(
d |hBA
[
d +
N∑
k=1
uk
]
, hBA
)
= log2(M ) bits . (10)
Note that the knowledge of hBA, N and M at node ‘B’
allows the legitimate receiver to compute u(θBA), therefore the
level of equivocation at ‘B’ due to the jamming component is
equal to
h
(
d |hBA
[
d +
N∑
k=1
uk
]
, hBA
)
= h (d |d)
= 0 bits , (11)
resulting in a legitimate channel capacity of log2(M )
bits.
Regarding the capacity of the eavesdropper, since the jam-
ming component u(θBA) is aligned in the same signal dimen-
sion of d , it is impossible for the eavesdropper separate u(θBA)
from d , even considering NE →∞, i.e. unlimited number of
antennas at Eve. Therefore, assuming that hEA,N andM is the
only information available at ‘E’, the eavesdropper channel
capacity is formulated as
I (d; yE ) = h(yE )− h(yE |d)
= h
(
hEA
[
d+
N∑
k=1
uk
])
−h
(
hEA
[
d+
N∑
k=1
uk
]
|d
)
= h
(
d +
N∑
k=1
uk
)
− h
(
d +
N∑
k=1
uk |d
)
= h
(
d +
N∑
k=1
uk
)
− h
(
N∑
k=1
uk
)
. (12)
Because of the independent relation between the imaginary
and real parts of a square M -QAM constellation, the amount
of information contained in this type of modulation is equally
divided by the real and imaginary components. As derived
in (13), the capacity of the eavesdropper channel can be
computed using just the real part of the signal observed
at ‘E’.
I (d; yE ) = h
(
d +
N∑
k=1
uk
)
− h
(
N∑
k=1
uk
)
= h
(
<
{
d +
N∑
k=1
uk
})
− h
(
<
{
N∑
k=1
uk
})
+ h
(
=
{
d +
N∑
k=1
uk
})
− h
(
=
{
N∑
k=1
uk
})
= 2×
[
h
(
< {d}+
N∑
k=1
< {uk}
)
−h
(
N∑
k=1
< {uk}
)]
(13)
Since the real part of a square M -QAM constellation is
defined as an L-PAM signal withM = L2, the computation of
the eavesdropper channel capacity reduces to the calculation
of the entropy of the summation of several independent uni-
formly distributed L-PAM signals. Considering the discrete
entropy formulation, and defining the random variables ZN+1
and ZN as in (14) and (15),
ZN+1 = <{d} +
N∑
k=1
< {uk} (14)
ZN =
N∑
k=1
< {uk} (15)
the capacity of the eavesdropper channel can be simplified as
follows in (16).
I (d, yE ) = 2×
∑
zN
p(zN ) log2 p(zN )
−2×
∑
zN+1
p(zN+1) log2 p(zN+1) (16)
Taking into account the fact that ZN+1 and ZN are generated
as a sum ofN+1 andN uniformly distributed L-PAM random
variables respectively, the next step required to calculate
I (d, yE ) is to compute the probability mass function (pmf)
of ZN+1 and ZN for general number of jamming terms N and
constellation order L. According to [29], the pmf of the sum
of n independent random variables with discrete uniform dis-
tribution over a set of equally spaced points with cardinality
L can be computed using the coefficients of the polynomial
expansion of (17), which are referred as the multinomial
coefficients.
g(x) =
(
L−1∑
α=0
xα
)n
(17)
Therefore, using the results in [29], the probability dis-
tributions of (14) and (15) can be computed applying the
general pmf formulation defined in (18) considering qn ∈
{0, 1, . . . , n(L − 1)}.
p(qn) = nLn
bqn/Lc∑
p=0
0(1+n+qn−pL)(−1)p
0(p+1)0(2+n−p)0(qn−pL+1)

(18)
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I (d, yE )
= 2
N (L−1)∑
qN=0
 N
LN
bqN /Lc∑
p=0
0(N+qN−pL)(−1)p
0(p+1)0(1+N−p)0(qN−pL+1)
 log2
 N
LN
bqN /Lc∑
p=0
0(N+qN−pL)(−1)p
0(p+1)0(1+N−p)0(qN−pL+1)

−2
(N+1)(L−1)∑
qN+1=0
N+1
LN+1
bqN+1/Lc∑
p=0
0(1+N+qN+1−pL)(−1)p
0(p+1)0(2+N−p)0(qN+1−pL+1)

× log2
N + 1
LN+1
bqN+1/Lc∑
p=0
0(1+ N + qN+1 − pL)(−1)p
0(p+ 1)0(2+ N − p)0(qN+1 − pL + 1)
 (19)
Replacing in (18) the n parameter byN+1 andN , the prob-
ability distributions of (14) and (15) can be obtained. Addi-
tionally, using the resulting probability distributions of (14)
and (15) into (16), a closed formulation for the eavesdropper
channel capacity is computed in (19), as shown at the top of
this page. Finally, applying (10) and (19) to (3), the closed
formulation for the secrecy capacity of the proposed jamming
scheme is obtained for general N and M parameters.
2) ASYMPTOTIC SECRECY CAPACITY FOR 4-QAM
MODULATION
The purpose of this point is to make an asymptotic analysis
for N →∞ of the secrecy capacity of the scheme described
in section III considering 4-QAM signals, i.e. L = √4 = 2.
In this case, the pmf’s of ZN+1 and ZN follow a bino-
mial distribution. The analysis of the asymptotic behavior
is done using the DeMoivre-Laplace Theorem formulated
in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (DeMoivre-Laplace Theorem [30]): When
N → ∞ with p fixed, considering p + q = 1 conditioned
to p, q > 0. Then, for k in the
√
Npq neighborhood of Np,
we can approximate(
N
k
)
pkqN−k ' 1√
2piNpq
exp
[
− (k − Np)2
2Npq
]
. (20)
This theorem states that a binomial distribution can be
approximated by a normal distribution with mean Np and
variance Npq assuming that N → ∞ and p, q > 0. There-
fore, using the normal distribution approximation defined in
Theorem 1, the normalized capacity of the eavesdropper
channel for N → ∞ and L = 2 is derived in (21) applying
the already known formulation of the entropy of a normal
distribution.
lim
N→∞
I (d, yE )
log2 (4)
= lim
N→∞ [h (zN+1)− h (zN )]
= 1
2
× lim
N→∞
(
log2 [2pie (N + 1) pq]− log2 [2pieNpq]
)
= 1
2
× lim
N→∞
(
log2
[
2pie
(
N + 1
4
)]
− log2
[
2pie
N
4
])
= 1
2
× lim
N→∞
[
log2
(
N + 1
N
)]
≤ 1
2N
= 0 bits (21)
Finally, through (21) is possible to conclude that for L = 2
and N → ∞, the leakage of information at the eavesdrop-
per tends to zero, making the secrecy capacity equal to the
capacity of the legitimate channel, i.e. log2(M ) bits.
3) ASYMPTOTIC SECRECY CAPACITY FOR N = 1
In this case, the objective is to demonstrate that the normal-
ized secrecy capacity of the scheme in III tends to log2(M )
when N = 1 and M → ∞. Since the cardinality of <{d} +
<{u1} is equal to |<{d} + <{u1}| = 2L − 1, it follows that
h(<{d} + <{u1}) ≤ log2(2L − 1) which leads to the upper
bound (22) on the normalized capacity of the eavesdropper
channel.
I (d, yE )
log2 (M)
= h (d + u1)− h (u1)
log2 (M)
= 2× h (< {d} + < {u1})− h (< {u1})
log2
(
L2
)
≤ 2× log2 (2L − 1)− log2 (L)
log2
(
L2
)
= log2
(
2− 1
L
)
× 1
log2 (L)
(22)
As demonstrated in (23), the limit of the upper bound in (22)
for L →∞ is zero. This result allows to conclude that when
the constellations order M = L2 goes to infinite, the leakage
of information at the eavesdropper is zero.
lim
L→∞
[
log2
(
2− 1
L
)
× 1
log2 (L)
]
= lim
L→∞
[
log2
(
2− 1
L
)]
× lim
L→∞
[
1
log2 (L)
]
= 0 bits (23)
Once more, applying the result derived in (23) to expres-
sion (3), an asymptotic secrecy capacity of log2(M ) bits is
achieved.
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B. NOISY CHANNEL
In order to analyze the secrecy performance of the proposed
jamming scheme in a more realistic scenario, a lower bound
on the secrecy capacity is formulated in this sub-section con-
sidering receiver noise at ‘B’ and ‘E’. The secrecy capacity
bound is obtained by computing an upper bound on the eaves-
dropper channel capacity, as well as a lower bound on the
legitimate channel capacity. Applying directly the Data Pro-
cessing Inequality Theorem [31] to the capacity of the eaves-
dropper channel computed for the noiseless scenario, it is
possible to conclude that the results in (19), (21) and (22) are
upper bounds of the eavesdropper channel capacity. In regular
words, theData Processing Inequality Theorem states that the
addition of independent random noise nE at the eavesdropper,
never increases the amount of information regarding d that
node ‘E’ can extract from the observed signal yE .
At the legitimate receiver, a lower bound on the channel
capacity is derived applying the Fano’s Inequality Theorem
formulated in Theorem 2 [31]. The Fano inequality estab-
lishes a relation between the error probability Pe and the
equivocation rate; therefore, computing Pe, an upper bound
on h(d |yB) can be calculated.
Theorem 2 (Fano’s Inequality) [31]: For any estimator Xˆ
considering the Markov chain, X → Y → Xˆ with Pe =
P{Xˆ 6= X}, an upper bound on the equivocation is defined as
h (X |Y ) ≤ h
(
X |Xˆ
)
≤ h(Pe)+ Pe log2 (|X | − 1) (24)
with h(Pe) being the binary entropy given by
h(Pe) = −Pe log2 Pe − (1− Pe) log2(1− Pe). (25)
As considered in (13), the calculation of the legitimate chan-
nel capacity I (d; yB) for a square QAM signal d is done
exploring the fact that an M -QAM constellation can be
decomposed in two independent L-PAM constellations when
M = L2. Therefore, d is drawn uniformly from an L-PAM
set in the following mathematical demonstration.
The first step to compute h(d |yB) will be to derive an
analytical upper bound on the error probability Pe of the
signal yˆB estimated at the legitimate receiver. As formulated
in (26), in the first phase of the estimation process at node
‘B’, perfect cancelation of u(θBA) in yB is done as follows
yB,c = yB − hBAu(θBA)
= hBAd + nB. (26)
After the cancelation of the jamming component, the esti-
mated signal yˆB is computed by equalizing yB,c with
u = e−jθBA :
yˆB = uyB,c
= |hBA| d + e−jθBAnB
= |hBA| d + n˜B. (27)
Note that the noise distribution n˜B = e−jθBAnB in (27) is the
same of nB; therefore, using (27) and defining a = |hBA| as
a Rayleigh random variable and dmin as the minimal distance
between the constellation points in d , an upper bound on the
instantaneous error probability for a static realization of hBA
is obtained as follows
Pe,awgn (a) ≤ exp
[
− (dmina)2
8σ 2B
]
. (28)
Then, averaging Pe,awgn(a) over the probability
distribution
pray(a) = a
σ 2r
× exp
(
− a
2
2σ 2r
)
(29)
of a Rayleigh random variable with fixed scale parameter σ 2r ,
follows
PE =
+∞∫
0
Pe,awgn (a)× pray (a) da
=
+∞∫
0
a
σ 2r
× exp
[
−a2 ×
(
d2min
8σ 2B
+ 1
2σ 2r
)]
da
= 4σ
2
B
σ 2r d
2
min + 4σ 2B
, (30)
which accordingly to (30) leads to the following upper bound
on the error probability of (27)
Pe ≤ min
(
L − 1
L
;PE
)
. (31)
Note that dmin can be increased changing the value of the
transmit power P or the order L of the PAM constellation.
The derivation of dmin as a function of L and P is formulated
in [32] as
dmin =
√
12
L2 − 1 ×
(
P
N + 1
)
. (32)
Applying the result in (31) to (24), a lower bound on the
legitimate channel capacity for a square M -QAM constella-
tion with M = L2, is obtained as follows
I (d; yˆB) ≥ 2×
[
h(d)− h(d |yˆB)
]
= 2× log2 (L)− 2×
[
hb (Pe)+ Pe log2 (|d | − 1)
]
= log2 (M)−2×
[
hb (Pe)+Pe log2 (L − 1)
]
. (33)
The analysis of (30)-(33) allows to conclude that for a fixed
value of L and σ 2B , the legitimate channel can reach the full
capacity of log2(M ) = 2× log2(L) increasing P.
In order to ensure secrecy, the jamming component must
be generated independently for each information data sym-
bol transmitted, hence, in average the transmission of infor-
mation is limited to the minimum rate at which we can
get independent channel estimates multiplied by the num-
ber of bits that is possible to extract in each estimation.
However, this kind of techniques, where the secrecy is fully
supported by the randomness of the wireless channel, is tar-
geted to secure small blocks of highly sensitive information.
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Possible examples include the exchange of banking informa-
tion like credit card numbers, predefined secret keys or any
other sensitive information that requires perfect secrecy.
In these cases, the legitimate nodes can store the reciprocal
past channel estimates, and when some credit card number or
other sensitive information needs to be transmitted, the legit-
imate terminals use the stored past channel estimates to send
this information in secrecy. Then, the secured information can
be sent at the rate(s) offered by the wireless communication
system (e.g. 802.11, LTE).
V. RESULTS
This section presents the numerical and theoretical secrecy
capacity results regarding the jamming scheme proposed
in III. The capacity results in bits per channel use (Bpcu) are
divided by log2(|d |), with |d | defining the cardinality of the
information source, i.e. the presented results are normalized
in interval [0,1]. Therefore, if the result is one, all the infor-
mation from the source is obtained, however, if the result is
zero, no information is extracted from the observed signal.
A. RESULTS FOR NOISELESS CHANNEL
In this first set of results, the secrecy performance for the
noiseless scenario is evaluated considering just the eaves-
dropper channel capacity. Note that for σ 2B = 0, the capacity
of the legitimate channel is always equal to I (d, yB) =
log2(M ) bits; therefore, under these conditions the secrecy
level can be assessed analyzing just the eavesdropper channel
capacity.
The simulated and theoretical results depicted in Fig. 3 con-
sider N ranging from one to nine, with 4-QAM modulation
for both d and uk , k = 1, 2, . . . ,N . It is possible to check
that when the jamming component u(θBA) is formed by a
single term, i.e. N = 1, the eavesdropper has access to
half of the information exchanged between the legitimate
parties. However, as shown in Fig. 3 and demonstrated
in (21), the eavesdropper channel capacity tends to zero
FIGURE 3. Eve capacity in noiseless channel for general N and 4-QAM
constellations for data and jamming components.
when the number of jamming terms N in u(θBA) goes to
infinite. Besides the exact eavesdropper channel capacity
curves, in Fig. 3 is also depicted the theoretical approximation
considered in (21), i.e. 0.5 log2[(N + 1)/N ]. As expected,
when the value of N grows, the theoretical approximation
converges to the exact capacity of the eavesdropper channel.
Instead of varying N for a fixed M , the curves in Fig. 4
expose the secrecy level of the proposed jamming scheme
when a single term is used for the jamming component u(θBA).
As derived in (22) and (23), the curves in Fig. 4 confirm
that increasing the order M of the square QAM constella-
tions used for d and u1, the secrecy level of the proposed
secrecy technique tends asymptotically to log2(M ), i.e. the
leakage of information at the eavesdropper goes to zero.
The theoretical upper bound derived in (22) is also depicted
in Fig. 4.
FIGURE 4. Eve capacity in noiseless channel for N = 1 and general
M-QAM constellations for data and jamming components.
The results presented in Fig. 5 were acquired for N ∈
{1, 2, 5} and M = 4m, m = {1, 2, . . . , 8}. As expected, for
a fixed constellation order M , the level of equivocation at
FIGURE 5. Eve capacity in noiseless channel for N = {1,2,5} and general
M-QAM constellation for data and jamming components.
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the eavesdropper increases for a larger number of jamming
terms N in the jamming component u(θBA). In Fig. 6,
the capacity of the eavesdropper channel was assessed as a
function of the number of bits extracted from the channel
assuming two different parameter configurations for the jam-
ming component in (7), which are: variable N with M = 4
fixed; andN = 1 fixed with variableM . Observing the curves
in Fig. 6 is possible to conclude that for the same number of
bits extracted from the channel, the level of secrecy is larger
in the case of M = 4 fixed and N variable. In other words,
the capacity of the eavesdropper channel is lower when
the channel-extracted bits are used to increase the number
of 4-QAM jamming terms instead of used to increase the con-
stellation orderM when a single jamming term is considered.
In summary, the three main conclusions obtained from this
first evaluation are: the proposed scheme achieves asymptot-
ically a full secrecy capacity; the theoretical derivations for
the secrecy capacity confirm the simulated results; and for the
same number of bits extracted from the channel, increasing
the number of jamming terms N in (7) allows to reach higher
secrecy capacity.
FIGURE 6. Capacity Eve channel for N = 1 and M = 4 in function of the
number of bits extracted from the channel.
B. RESULTS FOR NOISY CHANNEL
In the noisy channel scenario, a lower bound on the secrecy
level is obtained computing an upper bound on the eaves-
dropper channel capacity, and a lower bound in the case
of the legitimate channel capacity. The evaluation of the
secrecy capacity lower bound regarding the jamming scheme
proposed in this work is depicted in Fig. 7 for N = 9
and M ∈ {4, 16, 64}. The simulated results were acquired
using the Fano’s Inequality Theorem considering a maximum
likelihood (ML) equalizer to compute the probability of error
of the estimated signal in (27).
In the case of the theoretical results, the derivations in
(30) and (31) were directly used in theorem 2. The results
in Fig. 7 show that in the high SNR regime, for fixed N = 9
andM = 64, the secrecy capacity lower bound is pretty close
of the full secrecy capacity. Another important observation is
related to the fact that when the value ofM grows, an increase
FIGURE 7. Lower bound on secrecy capacity for noisy channel
considering N = 9 and M = {4,16,64}.
on the SNR conditions must be verified in order to maintain
the same level of secrecy. Note that in the high SNR regime a
full capacity of log2(M ) is always achieved for the legitimate
channel, therefore, the secrecy capacity will depend on the
capacity of the eavesdropper channel, which in turn is a
function ofN andM . As shown in (21) and (23), whenN orM
increase, the capacity of the eavesdropper channel tends to
zero. This means that in the high SNR regime for large N
or M , full secrecy capacity is asymptotical achieved. The
difference between the simulated and theoretical results is
explained by the fact that while in the simulated results the
error probability was computed numerically using a Monte
Carlo integration method, in the case of the theoretical results
the upper bound (31) was considered for the error probability.
Nevertheless, the asymptotical behavior of the simulated and
theoretical results is identical, i.e. both show that full secrecy
is reached in the high SNR regime increasing M or N .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed a jamming scheme that exploits
the reciprocal wireless channel with the aim to create equiv-
ocation at the eavesdropper without affecting the channel
capacity of the legitimate receiver. We derived closed form
solutions for the secrecy capacity and proved through an
asymptotic analysis that in the high power regime the pro-
posed scheme achieves full secrecy capacity independently
of the number of antennas at the eavesdropper. Additionally,
the study of the secrecy level provided by different con-
figurations of the jamming component allowed to conclude
that for the same number of bits extracted from the channel,
increasing the number of low cardinality jamming terms
in the jamming component allows to reach higher secrecy
capacity than using a single jamming term with increased
cardinality.
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